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I. INTRODUCTION
A Minnesota plaintiff with a fraud claim has many options to
choose from in determining what counts to include in a court
complaint. One of the most popular in Minnesota is a claim under
Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Statute, in part because the gold at the
† Nancy Brasel is a partner at Greene Espel, PLLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
where she practices in the areas of business litigation, securities litigation, and
employment law and litigation.
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end of that particular rainbow can include attorneys’ fees, through a
statutory device known as the Private Attorney General (“AG”)
Statute. Claims under the Private AG Statute are ostensibly brought
in the stead of Minnesota’s attorney general, on the theory that a
private plaintiff should be rewarded for standing in the shoes of other
defrauded Minnesota plaintiffs. Ten years ago, the Minnesota
Supreme Court appeared to take the view that in order to bring a
claim under this statute, it was not necessary for a plaintiff to confer a
1
benefit to the public. The court’s decision came despite a call from
Justice John Simonett that it was “time to look more closely” at the
statute, which in his opinion required a plaintiff to prove a public
2
benefit.
Two years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court heeded Justice
Simonett’s call, reversed itself and held that a private action under
3
the Private AG Statute is only available if it will benefit the public.
The court did not, however, specify what particular benefits to the
public warranted use of the Private AG Statute. Currently, there
remains little guidance about what circumstance might constitute a
“public benefit” that would turn a private fraud claim into a
consumer fraud claim under the Private AG Statute.
II. MINNESOTA LAW: THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
A. Statutory Scheme
The Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act is one of several consumer
protection statutes enacted in Minnesota to prohibit deceptive
4
practices in the sale of merchandise. The consumer protection
statutes do not by themselves provide for a private cause of action.
Instead, it is the Private AG Statute that provides “any person injured
5
by a violation” of these statutes “may bring a civil action and recover
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Minn. 1992); see infra Part II.B.
3. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000); see infra Part II.C.
4. The Consumer Fraud Act is found at MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.68-70 (2000).
Two similar statutes are the False Statement in Advertisement Act, MINN. STAT. §
325F.67 (2000), and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, MINN. STAT. § 325D.44
(2000).
5. The Private AG Statute provides remedies for a greater number of statutes
than the three listed above. See infra note 7.
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damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of
6
investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.” Section 8.31 of
Minnesota Statutes is actually entitled “Additional Duties of the
Attorney General,” and it provides the attorney general with the
authority to investigate and enforce several statutes that regulate
“unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business,
7
commerce, or trade.”
B. The Consumer Fraud Act is Not Limited to Individual Consumers
8

In 1992, in Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a building owner
could receive attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute. In Watpro,
the Church of the Nativity of Our Lord brought an action to recover
damages resulting from defective roofing materials installed on the
9
church’s school and convent. At the trial court level, the jury found
the manufacturer of the materials liable to the church on a number
of claims, including claims under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud
10
Act. The trial court entered a judgment for the church for over
$358,000, including approximately $121,000—over one third of the
11
church’s total recovery—in attorneys’ fees and investigation costs.
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that the Consumer Fraud
Act was intended to protect only individual or unsophisticated
consumers, and that the attorneys’ fees and investigation costs award
12
was therefore unwarranted. The court of appeals rejected this
argument, holding that the statute “does not limit recovery to
unsophisticated consumers,” and that “case law has not limited the

6. M INN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 3(a) (2000).
7. M INN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 1 (2000). These statutes include the Nonprofit
Corporation Act (sections 317A.001 to 317A.909), the Act Against Unfair
Discrimination and Competition (sections 325D.01 to 325D.07), the Unlawful Trade
Practices Act (sections 325D.09 to 325D.15), the Antitrust Act (sections 325D.49 to
325D.66), section 325D.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the
antidiscrimination acts contained in section 325D.67, the act against monopolization
of food products (section 325D.68), the act regulating telephone advertising services
(section 325D.39), the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (325F.68 to 325F.70), and
chapter 53A regulating currency exchanges. Id.
8. 491 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992).
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 8 n.14.
12. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 611-12
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 491 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992).
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13

scope of the statute to consumer transactions.” The supreme court
agreed, using both the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG
Statute in its analysis. The court held that the Consumer Fraud Act
“does not expressly limit its application to individual consumers,” and
14
applies “to transactions involving all consumers.”
The court did not directly address—-and it appears the
defendant did not make—-any argument that the Private AG Statute
did not allow a private cause of action because the statute required a
public benefit. The court did address the purpose of the Private AG
Statute, however, and held that it applied to these circumstances.
“The purpose of the private attorney general statute is to ‘eliminate
financial barriers to the vindication of a plaintiff’s rights . . . and to
15
provide incentive for counsel to act as private attorney general.’”
These purposes applied to the Church’s circumstances, according to
the court, because the Church’s “pursuit of a remedy has involved
16
much time and labor; it has been difficult, lengthy and expensive.”
Moreover, given the monetary award to the church, “[i]f there are no
attorney fees awarded in this case, Nativity will spend virtually all of its
17
damage award paying its attorneys.” The court noted that the
18
Private AG Statute was thus “intended to cover just this type of case.”
Three justices, however, disagreed with the majority on the
award of attorneys’ fees, urging that the case required the court to
“look more closely at the so-called ‘Private Attorney General
19
Statute,’” and asking, “[D]oes every false promise, every
13. Id. at 612.
14. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 8. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff’s
breach of warranty claim should have been rejected because the plaintiff did not
satisfy the notice requirements of M INN. STAT. § 336.2-607(3)(a), and that the action
was barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeals rejected both of these
arguments, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 4-7. The defendant
also argued that the church was a “sophisticated merchant,” making the transaction
between the parties solely within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at
7. The court of appeals also rejected this argument, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the transaction was “an ordinary consumer transaction
within the scope of state statutes regulating sales to consumers.” Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The court focused on the attorneys’ fees recovery because in Watpro, as
in many cases, the Private AG Statute is significant mainly for its inclusion of
attorneys’ fees. In Watpro, as in other cases, the plaintiff brought claims for common
law fraud and misrepresentation as well as under the Consumer Fraud Act. Thus, its
recovery of damages was covered by findings under these common law tort claims,
making the Private AG statute important because of the large attorneys’ fees award.
19. Id. at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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misrepresentation, or every misleading statement carry with it an
20
entitlement to attorney fees? I think not.”
The dissent, authored by Justice John Simonett, advocates that
the Private AG Statute and the Consumer Fraud Act must be read
together. The Consumer Fraud Act was “meant to protect consumers
21
being hoodwinked by sales promotion scams.” The Private AG
Statute was enacted “[b]ecause the attorney general’s office does not
have the resources to pursue all deceptive practices, and because an
aggrieved consumer may lack the resources to sue, particularly when
22
the claim is small and suit expense is high.” Thus, “the legislature
has authorized an award of attorney fees to give the disadvantaged
consumer access to the courts and an incentive to assist in the
23
curtailing of consumer fraud practices.”
According to the Watpro dissent, a consumer’s lack of resources
does not automatically render the Private AG Statute applicable.
Instead, the Private AG Statute should work to place some limits on
the Consumer Fraud Act, because “enterprising plaintiffs,
understandably interested in recovering investigation costs and
attorney fees, may expand the Consumer Fraud Act beyond its
24
intended scope.” This expansion was not envisioned by the
legislature. As Justice Simonett pointed out, the Consumer Fraud Act
differs from a common law fraud action in that it is not directed at
isolated fraud, but rather at a wider body of deceptive practices that
may be enjoined before they harm consumers. Moreover, also unlike
its common law counterpart, the Consumer Fraud Act does not
require a plaintiff actually to be deceived. Finally, the Private AG
Statute, by including “costs of investigation” in its recovery, indicates
that it is not intended to cover every claim of fraud brought by civil
25
litigants.
20. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Coyne joined in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Simonett, and Justice
Tomljanovich joined Justice Simonett’s partial dissent. Id. at 11.
21. Id. One of the main issues in Watpro was whether the Act applied to all
consumers, even if, like the church, they were not individual consumers. Id. at 8.
Since the “Act does not expressly limit its application to individual consumers,” the
majority held that the Act did not exclude the church, in part because the church was
a consumer and not a merchant under the U.C.C. Id. Justice Simonett agreed: “Read
literally, ‘any person’ means just that.” Id. at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, as the Watpro dissent points out, an expansion of the
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The dissent’s idea was not a new one to Minnesota courts. In
1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that “special factors”
26
applied to recoveries under the Private AG Statute. These “special
factors” related to the purpose behind awarding attorneys’ fees under
the statute: the award should “eliminate financial barriers to the
vindication of a plaintiff’s rights,” provide “incentive for counsel to
act as private attorney general,” and the award “must take into
account the degree to which the public interest is advanced by the
27
suit.” Otherwise, the court of appeals announced, “every artful
counsel could dress up his dog bite case to come under an attorney’s
28
fees statute.” The Watpro dissent built on the third “public interest”
factor. According to the Watpro dissent and the cases preceding it,
the Private AG Statute should not and does not cover “ad hoc
29
deceptions arising in private disputes.” Instead, the dissent
suggested that a claim or a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act
should be allowed under the Private AG Statute only if the following
test is met:
(1) the plaintiff must be a consumer, who is
(2) injured by an actionable fraud (such as in a common law
action for a false pretense, a false promise, or a
misrepresentation), and
(3) the fraud must have the potential to deceive and ensnare
members of the consumer public other than just the
plaintiff, so that
30
(4) plaintiff’s lawsuit has been of benefit to the public.
Private AG Statute could reverse the common law rule in the United States that
litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees. “[I]f there is to be a wholesale change in
awarding attorney fees, it should be done by express legislation.” Watpro, 491 N.W.2d
at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In Liess, the
plaintiff sued an individual defendant and a real estate company for fraud in
connection with the sale of a home. At trial, the jury found fraud by special verdict,
and the plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute. Id. at 557.
The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees, considering factors enumerated in State v.
Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 188 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. 1971), to determine the size of the
award, but it did not take into account the purpose of the Private AG Statute. The
court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of both the Paulson factors and
the policies supporting the Private AG Statute. Id. at 558.
27. Liess, 354 N.W.2d at 558.
28. Id. (quoting Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496, 503 (S.D. 1982));
see also Wexler v. Bros. Entm’t Group, 457 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(“When awarding attorney fees under the private attorney general statute, the trial
court must consider the public interest policies underlying the statute.”).
29. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 10.
30. Id. at 11. These requirements, according to the dissent, “would meet the
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Put another way, a plaintiff should be a consumer injured by
actionable fraud that has the potential to deceive other consumers so
31
that the lawsuit has benefited the public. Though this test echoes
the concern of the court of appeals in cases both before and after
32
Watpro, it has not been widely used, and until 2000, Minnesota
courts did not uniformly require plaintiffs to prove a “public benefit”
33
to bring claims under the Private AG Statute.
C. Ly v. Nystrom: Public Benefit Required
In 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the issue raised
by the dissent in Watpro, and reversed itself, at least on the issue of
34
attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute. In Ly v. Nystrom, the
court held that the Private AG Statute applies only to claimants who
35
demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public. Noting
that the Watpro court affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees but “did
not engage in analysis as to public benefit,” the court stated, “[t]o the
extent that [Watpro] could be construed to permit recovery under the
36
Private AG Statute without proof of public benefit, it is overruled.”
worthy purposes of the ‘Private Attorney General Statute’ while at the same time
keeping the payment of investigation costs and attorney fees within reasonable
bounds.” Id.
31. Control Data Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., Nos. C6-93-472, C2-93-579,
1993 WL 405303, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993), rev. denied (Dec. 22, 1993)
(interpreting the Watpro dissent).
32. See supra notes 26, 28.
33. After the supreme court’s decision in Watpro, some courts did pick up on the
dissent’s idea. See, e.g., Gray v. Conrad, Nos. C7-97-1784, CO-98-177, 1998 WL 404951,
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1998), rev. denied (Oct. 20, 1998) (holding that the
district court erred in its award of attorneys’ fees because the case was “fact-specific”
and “the protection of public consumers” was not implicated in the case); Untiedt v.
Grand Lab, Inc., Nos. C4-94-772, C0-94-851, 1994 WL 714308, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 27, 1994) (holding that because the trial court found that the cause of action
would advance the public interest, the trial court considered the appropriate factors);
Control Data Corp., 1993 WL 405303, at *6 (upholding denial of an attorneys’ fees
award in part because the court “fail[ed] to see how [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit was of
benefit to the public”).
34. 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id. at 314 n.25. Justice Page and Justice Gilbert each dissented from this
holding, arguing that the unambiguous language of the Private AG Statute imposes
no public benefit requirement. See id. at 315 (“Had the legislature intended to limit
the scope of [the Private AG Statute] to those causes of action that have a public
benefit, it could have easily done so. Whether for good or for ill, by the plain words
of the statute, it did not.”) (Page, J., concurring in part); id. (agreeing that the
majority “artificially engrafts a ‘public benefit’ requirement onto an unambiguous
statute”) (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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In this landmark case, the plaintiff Ly purchased a restaurant
from Nystrom, allegedly based on Nystrom’s representations about
37
gross monthly revenues and profits. After operating the restaurant
at a loss for six months, Ly brought suit against Nystrom for common
law fraud and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. At trial, the
district court concluded that Nystrom was liable to Ly for common
law fraud, but held that there was no violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act (and therefore no attorneys’ fees) because the fraudulent
representations were made from one individual to another, not to a
large number of consumers, and the representations did not have the
38
potential to deceive other consumers.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s determination that
the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG Statute did not apply.
The court of appeals reasoned that though consumer fraud statutes
were to be construed liberally, the Consumer Fraud Act does not
apply to business transactions between individuals:
Even if the Act applies more broadly than common law
fraud, it still only applies in consumer fraud situations and
the fraud or misrepresentation must be disseminated to
others. This was a one-on-one business transaction. If we
were to adopt the appellant’s interpretation of the statute,
virtually every fraudulent transaction
would come under
39
the consumer fraud umbrella.
The supreme court affirmed this holding with an analysis of both
40
the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG Statute. With regard to
37. Ly v. Nystrom, 602 N.W.2d 644, 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
38. Id. at 645-46.
39. Id. at 647. The court also determined that Ly did not meet the definition of
a consumer under the Consumer Fraud Act, because “he bought the restaurant with
the intent to produce, manufacture, and resell food, rather than with the intent of
direct ownership of the product.” Id. at 647. The Consumer Fraud Act itself does not
define “consumer.” The court relied on the dictionary definition that defines a
“consumer” as “one that acquires goods or services for direct use or ownership rather
than for resale or use in production or manufacturing.” Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1238 (3d ed. 1996)).
40. The court reversed the court of appeals’ determination that Ly was not a
“consumer.” Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 309-10.
While the CFA does not define ‘consumer,’ the legislative history
clearly indicates that the CFA was intended to protect a broad,
though not limitless, range of individuals from fraudulent and
deceptive trade practices, and our decisions have also recognized
the breadth of its coverage . . . . Thus, viewing appellant as a
‘consumer’ under the CFA does not push application of the
statute onto new ground.
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the Consumer Fraud Act, the supreme court determined that a
plaintiff may have a claim under the act even “in the context of an
41
isolated one-on-one transaction.”
Though the Consumer Fraud Act may apply in such a
circumstance, the Private AG Statute—which provides the remedy—is
another matter. The court correctly noted that the plain language of
the Private AG Statute, along with its sweeping remedies, “ha[s]
raised concern about how broadly the legislature intended the statute
to be applied, particularly as it relates to common law fraud actions
42
and the recovery of attorney fees.”
Analyzing the legislative history of the Private AG Statute, the
court determined that “the legislature could not have intended to
sweep every private dispute based on fraud, and falling within the
Consumer Fraud Act, into a statute where attorney fees and
43
additional costs and expenses would be awarded . . . .” Thus,
consistent with the history and purpose of the office of the attorney
general, the court imposed a public benefit requirement on
claimants who wish to bring claims under the statute. Since Ly was
defrauded in a “one-on-one transaction” in which the fraudulent
misrepresentation was made only to him, the public benefit
requirement was not met, and the court of appeals’ holding was
44
affirmed.
D. Post-Ly: Recognizing a Public Benefit When You See One
After the court’s decision in Ly v. Nystrom, the public benefit
requirement of the Private AG Statute has, perhaps, raised more
questions than it has answered. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
recently noted that no published Minnesota case sets forth a standard
for determining whether a party’s cause of action benefits the
45
public.
Id. at 310.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 311. The court cited the Watpro dissent’s argument “that a consumer
can claim attorney fees for ‘almost any commercial transaction that fails.’” Id.
(quoting Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992)) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id.
45. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001),
rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 28, 2002). Collins addressed the Private AG Statute and a false
advertising claim. There, the plaintiffs claimed that the school’s claims about their
program consisted of false advertising. The court reversed the denial of a request for
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In Ly itself, the court focused on the individual nature of the
transaction at issue, noting that “the fraudulent misrepresentation,
46
while evincing reprehensible conduct, was made only to appellant.”
Under Ly, it seems clear that the class of cases involving one-on-one
transactions will by definition fail to meet the public benefit
requirement.
In a recent federal court case, the court looked not at the nature
of the transaction, but at the damages sought by the plaintiff. There,
the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the
Private AG Statute because “the essence of [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit is
47
personal injury.” Despite an argument by the plaintiff that the
fraudulent misrepresentations were disseminated widely, the court
determined that claims for the type of damages sought by the
plaintiff—medical expenses, pain and suffering, wage loss, and
emotional distress—“are not brought for the benefit of the public,”
and therefore the plaintiff’s claims under the Consumer Fraud Act
48
and the False Advertising Act were dismissed.
In false advertising cases, the courts’ treatment of the public
benefit rule has also been difficult to predict. Collins v. Minnesota
School of Business, a 2002 Minnesota Court of Appeals case upon which
review has been granted, suggests that the existence of a false
advertising claim by itself will meet the public benefit requirement
attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute, following federal courts that have
“consistently held that the prevention of false or misleading advertising is a public
benefit.” Id. at 820 (citing cases). Since the school advertised its program to “the
public at large,” the court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a public benefit.
Id. at 821.
46. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. The Ly court also cited analyses by other courts
emphasizing that a public benefit is not conferred in a one-on-one transaction. See
Cooperman v. R.G. Barry Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding
that the statute is not to be read so broadly that it is “applicable to any contract
remotely related to the ultimate sale of merchandise”) (quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at
312 n.18); Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences, 698 N.E.2d 257, 268-69 (Ill Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that the Consumer Fraud Act of Illinois did not apply to basic
breach of contract cases) (cited in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 312 n.18).
47. Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No. CUV, 01-1655, 2002 WL 1023153, *5 (D. Minn.
May 20, 2002). In Pecarina, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of a
non-child-resistant version of the Aim ‘n Flame lighter, after her children started a
fire with the device and suffered burns. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *5. Pecarina demonstrates that while the issue under the Private AG
Statute is often framed only in the context of a request for attorneys’ fees, the impact
of the rule is much broader. The Private AG Statute is the only vehicle for bringing a
private cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act or the False Advertising Act (as
well as the other statutes cited in the Private AG statute). M INN. STAT. § 8.31, subd.
3(a) (2000); see also supra note 7. As illustrated by Pecarina, these causes of action
cannot be maintained without proof of a public benefit.
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because “the prevention of false or misleading advertising is a public
49
benefit.” The federal district court, however, has not followed this
rule to the letter, rejecting a claim for attorneys’ fees in a false
advertising case in which the claim was brought by a competitor that
50
had used the same tactics in its own advertising. The court noted
that while there is “no doubt” that some public interest is furthered by
the elimination of false advertising, the award of fees is unwarranted
as a matter of equity where the plaintiff has engaged in similar
51
behavior.
The results of these cases are not necessarily inconsistent, and by
themselves may not be troubling. But the lack of precise standards
used by the courts in determining whether the requirement in Ly is
met has not lent much guidance to trial courts, who are left to apply a
version of Justice Potter Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” theory to
52
the public benefit rule.
E. Clues to a Public Benefit: Purposes of the Private
Attorney General Statute
In the search for standards by which to judge a public benefit, it
is useful to start where the Ly court started before it imposed the
requirement—-with the purposes behind the Private AG Statute
53
itself. Moreover, while the Ly court did not adopt specific standards,
its reliance on past cases provides hints to its definition of a public
benefit.

49. 636 N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 28,
2002). The Collins court, which relied on several federal court holdings for its
holding, noted that the defendant “advertised its program to the public at large,” and
that “but for [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit, an indefinite class of potential consumers might
have been injured in the same manner as were appellants.” Id. at 821.
50. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054-55
(D. Minn. 2001), aff’d in relevant part, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
51. Transclean, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. The Transclean court only applied this
ruling to the request for attorneys’ fees, allowing the false advertising claim to stand.
The court noted, “Notwithstanding Transclean’s entitlement to damages, attorney’s
fees under the Private AG Statute are discretionary with the Trial Court.” Id. at 1055
(internal citations omitted). Though the defendant did not argue that it was entitled
to summary judgment based on the court’s public benefit theory, the court addressed
the argument, and noted that “different considerations influence our ascertainment
of a reasonable fee award.” Id. at 1057 n.5. Thus, the jury’s award on damages
“should not be further enhanced by a fee award.” Id.
52. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
53. See Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 310-14 (Minn. 2000) (discussing the
history and purpose of the Private AG Statute).
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1. Standing in the Shoes of the Attorney General: Advancing the
“State Interest”
First, the purpose of the private remedies provided for in the
statute lies in its broader context: the Private AG Statute is a part of
the statute defining the duties of the Minnesota Attorney General.
Thus, a private litigant necessarily acts as “a substitute for the attorney
54
general.” The attorney general, in turn, can only appear in civil
lawsuits “whenever, in the attorney general’s opinion, the interests of
55
the state require it.” Since the duty of the attorney general’s office is
“the protection of public rights and the preservation of the interests
of the state,” a private litigant cannot bring an action in the shoes of
56
the attorney general without serving this purpose as well.
Unfortunately, it is almost as difficult to define the “interests of the
state” as it is to define “public benefit.” While this statutory purpose
does not lend itself to concrete standards, it is crucial to remember
that the Private AG Statute begins with the premise that a private
litigant stands in the shoes of the attorney general, and therefore can
bring a claim only when the attorney general would do so.
2. Needs Analysis: Elimination of Financial Barriers
Second, part of the legislative intent behind the Private AG
Statute is to “eliminate financial barriers to the vindication of a
57
plaintiff’s rights.” Thus, in Watpro, the court determined that the
purpose of the Private AG Statute had been met in part by comparing

54. Id. at 311. State Senator Winston Borden, author of the bill, stated: “It’s
simply impossible for the Attorney General’s Office to investigate and prosecute every
act of consumer fraud in this state.” Hearing on S.F. 819, S. Comm. Labor and
Commerce, 68th Minn. Leg., Mar. 8, 1973 (audio tape) (comments of Sen. Borden),
quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311. Thus, “if a[n] individual could bring an action, he
can do some of the prosecuting, he can do some of the enforcing, he can provide
some of the protection for himself and others that the Attorney General’s Office ...
can not do today.” Id.
55. M INN. STAT. § 8.01, quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313; accord Slezak v.
Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1961) (holding that the attorney
general “has the authority to institute in a district court a civil suit in the name of the
state whenever the interests of the state so require”) (emphasis added), quoted in Ly, 615
N.W.2d at 313.
56. See Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 (noting that it is “clear that the sweep of the statute
can be no broader than the source of its authority—that of the attorney general—
whose duties are to protect public rights in the interest of the state”).
57. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn.
1992) (quoting Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984),
quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311.
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the cost of the suit with the damages recovered. This comparison led
the court to conclude that without an award of attorneys’ fees, the
plaintiff would have spent “virtually all of its damage award paying its
attorneys,” and the Private AG Statute “was intended to cover just this
58
type of case.”
The difficulty with this analysis is that while the elimination of
financial barriers may have been a purpose behind the Private AG
Statute, consideration of the cost of a suit to an individual plaintiff
does not ensure that the public will benefit from the suit. In Watpro,
the dissent argued that regardless of the individual plaintiff’s
monetary need for an attorneys’ fees award, the public was not
59
benefited merely because of this need. Indeed, if this were the only
requirement, the Private AG Statute could render a major change in
the American rule that parties are responsible for their own
60
attorneys’ fees. In Ly, the court did not consider any type of needs
analysis, perhaps recognizing that a true public benefit requires more
than a showing of need on the part of an individual plaintiff, and
more than a comparison of the award of damages versus the cost of
suit.
3. A Broader Audience Than One: Preventing Widespread Fraud
Third, the most significant purpose of the Private AG Statute,
identifiable from the legislative history and case law, is to prosecute
claims of fraud on behalf of others. One legislator noted that the law
61
was intended to stop those who “rip off a large number of citizens.”
The Ly court cited and recognized this purpose as central behind the
62
Private AG Statute. The court also relied upon a federal district
court case noting that the private attorney general concept “is based
on the rationale that counsel fees should be awarded by the court
when the legal services have provided a benefit to a class of persons,
63
not just the particular litigant.”
Moreover, as the Watpro dissent noted, the consumer protection
laws are aimed at practices—-a term that denotes fraud victimizing
58. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 8.
59. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. See id.
61. Hearing on H.F. 733, H. Comm. Commerce and Econ. Dev., 68th Minn.
Leg., Mar. 30, 1973 (audio tape) (comments of Rep. Sieben).
62. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 n.21.
63. Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. Minn. 1979) (discussing the
private attorney general concept of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976).
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64

more than one plaintiff. Thus, to meet this purpose of the statute, a
public benefit is not conferred in isolated instances of fraud. The
65
66
dissent in Watpro and the court in Ly focused centrally on this
purpose, requiring the fraud to “have the potential to deceive and
ensnare members of the consumer public other than just the
67
plaintiff.”
III. DISSIMILAR TAKES ON SIMILAR STATUTES
While Minnesota is not alone in requiring a private plaintiff to
prove a public benefit under consumer protection statutes, it is
68
certainly in the minority. Indeed, such requirements have been the
subject of harsh criticism as judicially created and unnecessarily
69
restrictive to private plaintiffs. Regardless of the wisdom of the
requirement, the search for a standard to measure a public benefit
logically leads to other states, some of which have similarly struggled
for a means to analyze the public interest/public benefit requirement
of their consumer protection statutes. In this regard, the path of the
Washington and Colorado courts in interpreting their consumer
70
protection statutes is particularly instructive to the current state of
Minnesota law.
A. Washington
In 1976, the Washington Supreme Court first narrowed the
scope of a private litigant’s remedy under the Washington Consumer
64. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), cited in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311 n.16.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Patterson v. Beall, 19 P.3d 839, 847 (Okla. 2000) (noting that a minority
of states have adopted a public interest element for consumer protection statutes,
including Colorado, Nebraska, and Washington, and declining to read such a
requirement into the Oklahoma statute); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1986) (noting that Washington “is very
clearly in the minority” in requiring a public interest showing of a private plaintiff,
and citing six states with the requirement). At least two state legislatures—Connecticut and Illinois—-have amended their state consumer protection statute to
eliminate a judicially created public interest requirement. See Collins v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Conn. 1985); Joseph G. Feehan, The Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act and the “Public Injury” Debate, 80 ILL . B.J. 136 (1992).
69. See Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 536 (“[O]ur public interest requirement has
been subject to harsh criticism.”) (citations omitted).
70. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–.920 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101-709
(2002).
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Protection Act by holding that in order to prevail under the statute, a
plaintiff must show that the conduct complained of would be
71
“vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General.” In other
words, according to the court, the conduct must affect the public
72
interest. Four years later, in 1980, the Washington Supreme Court
noted accurately that “[n]either the legislature nor this court . . . has
otherwise formulated criteria for determining when” the public
73
interest requirement is met.
The court then developed a three-factor test for determining
public interest, which it later reconsidered and modified in Hangman
74
Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance. The current test, as set
forth in Hangman Ridge, requires a court to make a threshold
determination of whether the transaction was a “consumer
75
transaction” or a “private dispute.” While the distinction between
these two categories is often less than clear, a consumer transaction is
usually between a purchaser of goods and a seller, or between an
76
individual paying for services and the party rendering them.
If the transaction is a consumer transaction, the Washington
71. Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 544 P.2d 88, 90 (Wash. 1976). There is a private
right of action under the Washington Consumer Protection Act. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.86.090 (2002).
72. Lightfoot, 544 P.2d at 90.
73. Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184, 187 (Wash. 1980); see also David J. Dove,
Washington Consumer Protection Act—-Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH L.
REV. 201, 202 (1984) (noting that the court in 1976 “did not indicate a criterion that
would define the public interest and thereby standardize the determination of when
an injury to a private party would constitute a threat to the public interest”); cf.
Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535 (“Since the Lightfoot decision, the confusion
surrounding private rights of action under the CPA has steadily increased.”).
74. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535-36. Before Hangman Ridge, Washington
courts required proof that the (1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or
practices induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffered
damage; and (3) the defendant’s deceptive acts or practices have the potential for
repetition. Anhold, 614 P.2d at 188. The Hangman Ridge court changed the test
significantly, noting, “[i]t has become clear that this ‘inducement-damage-repetition’
test is not the best vehicle for showing that the public was or will be affected by the act
in question.” Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 537.
75. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
76. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 733 P.2d 208, 211 (Wash. 1987); see also
Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 792 P.2d 142, 148 (Wash. 1990) (holding that the
purchase of a mobile home is a consumer transaction); Travis v. Wash. Horse
Breeders Ass’n, 759 P.2d 418, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the purchase
of a race horse at an auction is a consumer transaction); Broten v. May, 744 P.2d
1085, 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that commission dispute between two
competing real estate brokers is a private dispute); Aubrey’s R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy
Corp., 731 P.2d 1124, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the purchase of a
computer system for a business is a consumer transaction).
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court then analyzes the following factors to determine whether a
public interest is present:
(1) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of
defendant’s business?
(2) Are the acts part of a pattern or generalized course of
conduct?
(3) Were repeated acts committed prior to the act involving
plaintiff?
(4) Is there a real and substantial potential for repetition of
defendant’s conduct after the act involving plaintiff?
(5) If the act complained of involved a single transaction, were
77
many consumers affected or likely to be affected by it?
Since the Hangman Ridge case, Washington courts have made
clear that no single factor is dispositive, nor is it necessary that all be
78
present.
Where the transaction is essentially a private dispute, it is more
difficult—-but not impossible—-to show a public interest under the
Washington test. If the transaction is a private dispute, factors
indicating a public interest include:
(1) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of
defendant’s business?
(2) Did the defendant advertise to the public in general?
(3) Did defendant actively solicit this particular plaintiff,
indicating potential solicitation of others?
(4) Did plaintiff and defendant occupy unequal bargaining
79
positions?
Despite these rather specific factors, the court in Hangman Ridge
noted more fundamentally that “it is the likelihood that additional

77. See Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538.
78. Mason, 792 P.2d at 148. “The factors ‘represent indicia of an effect on public
interest from which a trier of fact could reasonably find public interest impact.’”
Cotton v. Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878, 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Hangman
Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538). While courts often analyze and decide whether a public
interest is present as a matter of law, the determination is a question of fact to be
made by a trier of fact. See Cotton, 44 P.3d at 886 n.41 (reversing a grant of summary
judgment because whether a fee agreement impacted the public interest precluded
summary judgment on consumer protection claim).
79. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538. The public interest requirement in
Washington can also be established by a “per se” method, which requires a showing
that a statute has been violated that contains a specific legislative declaration of a
public interest impact. Id. For example, Washington statutes covering the
distribution and sale of vehicles and the sale of motor vehicle parts both contain
specific declarations that these subjects affect the public interest. Id. (citing statutes).
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plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion that
changes a factual pattern from a private dispute to one that affects
80
the public interest.” The Washington Supreme Court developed
the Hangman Ridge test to bring closure to increasing questions as to
the proper application of the public benefit test. However, the twoprong multi-factor test it developed may have engendered more
confusion than clarity. The threshold inquiry—-whether the
transaction is a “consumer” or a “private” transaction—-muddies the
waters considerably. In Minnesota, courts must determine whether
the plaintiff is a “consumer” in order to resolve whether the plaintiff
has a claim under the consumer protection statutes. Thus, the initial
portion of the Washington test is inapplicable to consideration of
Minnesota’s Private AG Statute. The remainder of the Washington
test, when reduced to its essence, attempts to uncover the number of
consumers who have been or may be affected by the defendant’s
practice.
B. Colorado
To prevail on a private cause of action under the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged conduct “significantly impacts the public as actual or
81
potential consumers of defendant’s goods, services, or property.”
82
The statute does not address “purely private wrong[s].”
In companion cases decided in 1998, the Colorado Supreme
Court devised a three-factor test to define the element of “public
interest” in the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Under the test, a
court must consider:
(1) the number of consumers directly affected by the challenged
practice;
(2) the relative sophistication and bargaining power of
consumers affected by the challenged practice, and
(3) evidence that the challenged practice previously impacted
83
other consumers or has significant potential to do so.
The companion cases reached opposite results under this test.

80. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538.
81. Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213, 221 (Colo. 1998). Section 6-1-113 of the
Colorado Statutes establishes private damages for violations of the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(1) (2002).
82. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222.
83. Id.
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84

In Hall v. Walter, a case against subdivision developers, the court
determined that the defendant developers’ practices implicated the
public as consumers because their misrepresentations—-in the form
85
of advertisement—-were directed to the market generally. In
86
Martinez v. Lewis, a plaintiff brought suit against a doctor retained by
an insurance company to perform independent medical evaluations,
arguing that the doctor committed a deceptive trade practice by
falsely representing his qualifications. The deception was committed
against the insurance company, in the context of a private agreement
87
with a single consumer in a position of relative bargaining strength.
Thus, the case did not significantly impact the public, and claims
88
under the Consumer Protection Act could not stand.
Under the Colorado approach, the difference between common
law fraud and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act lies first in
89
the numbers, and second in the experience of the consumer. A
deception that does not affect or have the potential to affect a
significant number of consumers will not meet the public impact
requirement of the Consumer Protection Act, and a deception that
reaches only sophisticated consumers does not fall within the
purposes behind the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. As the
court in Martinez noted, the Consumer Protection Act was designed
to protect the public as consumers “in situations where consumers do
not have and cannot reasonably gain access to truthful information
relevant to the contemplated transaction unless it comes from the
90
person offering the good, service or property.”

84. 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998). The Hall court relied upon the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision in Hangman Ridge for the general test for stating a cause of
action under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 234. It then clarified the
public interest factor: “While the public interest component is longstanding, we now
recognize that a more precise reading of the statute’s function requires an impact on
the public as consumers of the defendant’s ‘goods, services, or property.’” Id.
(quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(a)). The court noted that it would “look to the
Washington test as a model” for the public interest element. Id.
85. Id. at 235.
86. 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998).
87. Id. at 220-22.
88. Id. at 222-23.
89. See Catherine A. Tallerico, The Colorado Consumer Protection Act: An Update,29
COLO. LAW. 37, 38 (Jan. 2000).
90. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222. This element likely excludes most
business-to-business transactions. See Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (D. Colo. 2000).
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IV. A SUGGESTED TEST FOR MINNESOTA
A. Number of Consumers Potentially Affected
91

The public interest hurdle to consumer fraud claims in
Washington and Colorado has been in place for many years in each
state. Courts in each of these states have struggled with defining the
parameters of this requirement for as many years as it has been in
place. Minnesota courts would do well to learn and borrow from this
history, so as to provide the bench and bar with guidance on the
requirement announced in Ly v. Nystrom.
Of course, the driving force behind any public benefit standard
must be the Private AG Statute and its purposes. The court in Ly, the
dissent in Watpro, and the Act’s legislative history all suggest that like
both Colorado and Washington, the critical distinction between
common law fraud and fraud or deceptive practices covered under
92
the consumer protection statues lies in the numbers.
The purpose behind the Private AG Statute was not to cover “ad
93
hoc deceptions arising in private disputes.” Rather, the Private AG
Statute applies to plaintiffs who act as a substitute for the attorney
94
general, which necessarily means that they are representing other
consumers who have been or are likely to be injured by the same
95
conduct complained of in the private suit. Thus, two of the three
elements of the Colorado test logically apply in Minnesota, such that
91. The Washington and Colorado courts describe their requirement as a
“public interest” requirement; Minnesota’s role requires analysis of the potential
“public benefit.”
92. See Tallerico, supra note 89, at 38.
93. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10
(Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d at 313. The court stated:
A determination of the scope of the private remedies provision in
the Private AG Statute must begin with a recognition that it was
adopted by the legislature in 1973 as part of the statutory charter
for the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general and
provides a reward to private parties for uncovering and bringing to
a halt unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices,
functions that, to that point, had been the responsibility of the
attorney general.
Id. “If the attorney general is not authorized to commence a proceeding because it
would not result in a public benefit then a claimant under the Private AG Statute is
similarly constrained.” Id. at 314 n.22.
95. See id. at 313 n.21 (noting Representative Sieben’s comment that the
Private AG Statute is intended to stop those who “rip off a large number of
citizens”).
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a Minnesota court should consider (1) the number of consumers
directly affected by the challenged practice; and (2) the evidence that
the challenged practice previously had impacted other consumers or
96
had significant potential to do so in the future. This test also
encompasses much of the Washington analysis, which at its base
attempts to uncover the number of consumers affected by the
97
defendant’s actions.
The third Colorado factor, which also appears in the
Washington analysis for “private” transactions, instructs the court to
consider the relative sophistication and bargaining power of the
98
parties. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged in both Ly
and Watpro that the Private AG Statute was enacted in part to
99
“eliminate financial barriers to the vindication of a plaintiff’s rights.”
In Ly, the court seemed to add the public interest requirement to the
statute despite this purpose, rather than because of it, noting the
reservations of the Watpro dissent and the court of appeals that the
Private AG Statute could be expanded beyond its intended scope.
Both the Ly majority and the Watpro dissent can be read to suggest
that an analysis of the sophistication of the parties is not relevant to a
public benefit. Nothing about the bargaining power of the parties to
a private lawsuit speaks to the issue of whether the consumers of
Minnesota are benefited by a particular plaintiff’s action. Thus, an
unsophisticated consumer with little bargaining power should not be
allowed to make use of the Private AG Statute unless the transaction
he or she complains of reaches a wider audience, as addressed by the

96. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222.
97. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d
531, 538 (Wash. 1986). Many of the factors cited by the Washington Supreme Court
in the test applying to a consumer transaction question the number of consumers
reached by the conduct, including whether the act was part of a pattern of conduct,
whether the acts were repeated, whether there is a potential for repetition, and how
many consumers were actually affected. Similarly, the Washington test applicable to a
“private” transaction questions the number of consumers affected, by asking whether
the defendant advertised to the public and whether the defendant’s actions indicate
the potential solicitation of others. Id.
98. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222; see also id. (“The CCPA provides consumers who
are in a position of relative bargaining weakness with protection against a range of
deceptive trade practices.”); Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538 (holding that when the
transaction is a private transaction, the court should consider whether the plaintiff
and defendant occupied unequal bargaining positions).
99. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311; Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc.,
491 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (both quoting Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
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100

B. Attorney General Substitution
Minnesota’s Private AG Statute differs from both the
Washington and the Colorado consumer protection statutes in that
the public benefit/public interest analysis in Washington and
Colorado is a part of the consumer protection statutes. In Minnesota,
the public benefit test is found in the statute addressing the duties of
the attorney general, not in the consumer protection statutes, which
by themselves do not include a private cause of action. This
distinction is crucial when considering the standards for the public
benefit test. “[T]he sweep of the statute can be no broader than the
source of its authority”; thus, a Minnesota plaintiff can only bring a
claim under the Private AG Statute if the attorney general could also
101
bring a claim. The Minnesota test should therefore include an
analysis of whether the attorney general would view the lawsuit as
102
suiting a public purpose and the interests of the state.
V. CONCLUSION
To be consistent with the principles announced in Ly and the
purposes behind the Private AG Statute, Minnesota courts should
consider the number of consumers directly affected or likely to be
affected by the defendant’s actions, and whether the attorney general
has the authority to bring the suit the plaintiff proposes. Such a test
provides guidance to courts, is faithful to the legislative history of the
statute, and assists in winnowing out those enterprising plaintiffs who,
through claims under the Private AG Statute, seek to expand the
consumer protection laws beyond their intended scope.

100. See, e.g., Gray v. Conrad, Nos. C7-97-1784, C0-98-177, 1998 WL 404951, at *6
(Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1998) (determining that an individual plaintiff could not
bring a claim under the Private AG Statute because the case was “totally fact-specific,”
and the “protection of public consumers at large [was] not implicated”).
101. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313.
102. Id. (noting that “[t]he duty of the attorney general’s office, and thus the
purpose of any statute granting private citizens authority to bring a lawsuit in lieu of
the attorney general, is the protection of public rights and the preservation of the
interests of the state”). This purpose of the statute reinforces the exclusion of
consideration of the relative sophistication of the parties, which does not affect
“public rights and the preservation of interests of the state.” Id.
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